



## ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

Campaign in Front of Washington in 1862.


## VIRGINIA FORTITUDE.

Two Hundred Thousand Men in Buckram.

## BANKS'S BLUNDER.

Orders Totally Disregarded by Corps Commanders.

BY GEN. JOHN POPE.



II. On the 28th of July, 1862, the day before I left Washington to join the Army of Virginia, the military situation may be thus stated: McClellan with the Army of the Potomac was entrenched at Harrison's Landing, on the James River, and was loudly calling for reinforcements of over rather than under 100,000 men, to protect himself from, or farther to operate against the 200,000 men in "buckram" whom he had generously bestowed on Gen. Lee, who was in front of Richmond with less than half of that force. Stonewall Jackson, with his Corps, was at Gordonsville, and between there and the Rapidan. J. E. B. Stuart, with his Cavalry Corps, was in observation of our forces at Fredericksburg.

GEN. POPE JOINS HIS ARMY.

The Army of Virginia (my own command) was concentrated (except King's Division) at Sperryville, Little Washington and Waterloo Bridge. On the morning of the 29th of July I left Washington to join the command. Perhaps few men have ever been



FAIR VIRGINIA.

richer in treasures of advice, warnings, encouragements and assurances than I was when I crossed the Potomac to assume a command and undertake military operations of the last degree. The weather had been extremely warm for several weeks, and I shall not soon forget the delightful change which the first breeze from the mountains brought with it. We passed the night at Warrenton, where, from the upper windows of a small school, then vacant, I caught my first view of the Blue Ridge. The moon was nearly full that night, the air came soft and cool from the not distant hills, and there was a deep silence and quiet upon the whole scene. A more lovely landscape or a more charming country the eye of man has not looked on, and the remembrance of that scene under the bright moonlight will always be a delight to me.

The next morning early we mounted and got off for Waterloo Bridge, where Ricketts' Division, of McDowell's Corps, was encamped.

A view of the country and of the Blue Ridge during that many successive days served to strengthen the impressions of the night before. The intense blue of the sky melting away into more subdued coloring of the same tint along the not distant ridges of the range; the gently uneven country, with occasional abrupt hills of no great altitude, covered with forest trees, and the rapid, winding mountain streams, with solitary muscades and occasional old-fashioned villages scattered without apparent effort here and there over the country, made a landscape that I cannot think of even to this day without keen pleasure. In nothing was the grandeur of Virginia (and the supreme grandeur of the South) more admirably manifested than in the resolute and uncompromising fortitude with which they saw this beautiful region trampled into mire by hostile armies and these ancient homes and lovely villages consigned to ruin. In no part of this broad land have the courage and pluck of its people shone forth with more lustre than in the Old Dominion during the late war, but God grant that never shall there arise another occasion again to test it in such a manner! Wrong no doubt they were in assenting to the attempt to break up the Union of these States, but they paid the penalty—and a penalty far heavier than was inflicted on any other State—with dignity and without complaint.

Its geographical position made it plain to all the world that Virginia must bear the heat and burden of the war, and it certainly is unfortunate that her example during the war and after the war was not more closely followed by the other States of the South. GEN. BANKS'S BLUNDER WITH THE CAVALRY.

To keep the troops of King's Division from lying in idleness at Fredericksburg, and also

to keep informed of any movements of the enemy on a large scale from Richmond toward the north, I instructed King to send detachments of cavalry to operate on the line of the Virginia Central Railroad, and as far as possible to interrupt or destroy communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley. Several cavalry expeditions which he dispatched for that purpose were very successful, and broke up the railroad at several places and on several occasions. At the same time I directed Gen. Banks to send forward a brigade of infantry and all of his cavalry, to march rapidly upon Culpeper Courthouse, and after taking possession of that place to push forward some cavalry on observation toward the Rapidan. On the 14th of July, after this movement had been successfully accomplished, I requested him to send the whole of his cavalry that night from Culpeper to Gordonsville by forced marches, and to destroy the railroad for 10 or 15 miles east of that place with part of his force, whilst the remainder of the force should push on toward Charlottesville, destroying railroad bridges and breaking up communications as far as possible. At that time there was no force of the enemy of any account at Gordonsville or in the vicinity, and the movement, as ordered, was quite practicable, and might have worked serious inconvenience to the enemy; but to my surprise and dissatisfaction I learned by dispatch from Gen. Banks on the 17th that the officer in command of the expedition had taken infantry, artillery and wagons with him, and because of bad roads he had only succeeded on the 17th in getting as far on the way as Madison Courthouse. Meantime on the 16th the advance of Jackson had reached Gordonsville, and the movement was no longer practicable.

Having completed necessary preparations I ordered Ricketts' Division to march on the 6th of August from Waterloo Bridge to Culpeper Courthouse, and Banks to move forward toward Culpeper to where the Hazel River is crossed by the pike from Sperryville to Culpeper, so that the whole force under my immediate command (except some of the cavalry) was on the 7th along that pike and in close relation with each other, and numbered 28,000 men on paper. King's Division remained at Fredericksburg. The cavalry forces covering the front of the army on that day were distributed as follows: Gen. John Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison Courthouse, with his pickets along the Rapidan from Burnett's Ford to the Blue Ridge. Sigel had been directed to post a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the road from Madison Courthouse to Sperryville crosses Robinson's River, as a support to Buford. Gen. Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted at Rapidan Station, at the point where the Orange & Alexandria Railroad crosses the river, with his pickets extending from Jacobson Ford on the east to a connection with Buford at Burnett's Ford. From Raccoon Ford to the forks of the Rappahannock above Falmouth the Rapidan was lined with cavalry pickets. On the top of Thoroughfare Mountain about half way between Bayard and Buford was established a signal station which overlooked the whole country as far south as Orange Courthouse. Thus we were prepared to know and to meet the expected movement of the enemy, which had already begun.

## THE ENEMY CROSSES THE RAPIDAN.


On the 7th of August I went to Sperryville and inspected the corps of Gen. Sigel. During the day I received reports that the enemy was crossing the Rapidan at several places between the railroad crossing and Liberty Mills, and at 4 o'clock I started with my staff and escort for Culpeper Courthouse. Crawford's Brigade, of Banks's Corps, had been there for several weeks, and on the 7th of August had been joined by Ricketts' Division from Waterloo Bridge. I arrived at Culpeper on the morning of the 8th, and during the whole morning I continued to receive reports from Gen. Bayard, who was slowly falling back from the Rapidan in the direction of Culpeper before the advance of the enemy; and from Gen. Buford, who also reported the enemy advancing in heavy force on his position at Madison Courthouse. My orders obliged me, as heretofore stated, to keep my communications with Fredericksburg perfectly secure, in order that there might be no obstacle to the free movements of the divisions of the Army of the Potomac



CAVALRY PICKETS ON THE RAPIDAN.

to join me from Aquia Creek, where the troops which had left the Peninsula first departed. These lefters were a constant embarrassment and constraint to me, and placed me much in the position of a man with one leg tied to a post, fighting with another free to move in every direction. I had nothing like force sufficient to contend in the open field against any considerable portion of Lee's army, and my plan, as heretofore stated, was to draw back against the Blue Ridge and occupy a strong position, so as to compel the enemy to attack me in it, or by moving off toward Washington, to have me on his flank and rear. The

## AN IMPENDING DANGER.



Shall American Labor be Trampled out under the Heel of Lazzaroni Immigration?

advance on Bayard from Rapidan Railroad Station directly threatened our communications with Fredericksburg, and that had to be met at once and effectively. I accordingly sent forward Crawford's Brigade, of Banks's Corps, toward Slaughter or Cedar Mountain early in the day, to support Bayard, who was falling back in that direction, and to assist him as far as he could in determining the strength and the movements of the enemy. In view of my enforced relations with Fredericksburg, and to make sure that they would not be broken up, I considered it necessary to give up my opinions and wishes and concentrate my whole army in the direction of Culpeper, so as thoroughly to cover the lower fords of the Rappahannock.

SIGEL FAILS TO MOVE AS ORDERED. I sent orders to Banks to move forward at once from Hazel River to Culpeper Courthouse, and at the same time sent the same



BY WHAT ROAD?

order to Sigel at Sperryville. To my surprise I received after dark a note from Sigel, dated at Sperryville at 6:30 the same afternoon, acknowledging the receipt of this order, but asking, before he moved, to be informed by what road he should march. As there was but one road from Sperryville and Culpeper, and that a broad turnpike, I was altogether at a loss to understand how there could be any such question on the subject. This unexplained and wholly absurd question, however, delayed for many hours the arrival of Sigel's Corps, and proved of serious injury to the subsequent operations. Early the next morning (Aug. 9) I directed Gen. Banks to move forward toward Cedar Mountain with his whole Corps to the position occupied by Crawford's Brigade, of his Corps, which had been sent to the front the day previous. I directed Gen. Banks to take up a strong position at or near the point occupied by that brigade, for the purpose of checking the enemy's advance and determining his force and the character of his movements. The consolidated report of Gen. Banks's Corps, received some days previously, exhibited an effective force of something over 14,000 men. It appeared subsequently, however, that he only led forward about 8,000 men; but although I several times called Gen. Banks's attention to the discrepancy between the forces set forth in his report and those he took to the front (as he afterward stated to me), he never was able to explain, nor could I ever comprehend how he could ever have made such a mistake, if mistake it was.

When he left Culpeper Courthouse to go to the front, I instructed him that, if the enemy advanced to attack him in the strong position he was ordered to take up, he should push his skirmishers well to the front and anticipate by attacking with them, and notify me immediately of the situation. I was so anxious that there should be no misunderstanding in carrying out these orders, that I sent Gen. B. S. Roberts, and old Army officer, who was Acting Inspector-General, to report to Gen. Banks, and see that he thoroughly comprehended and, as far as his (Gen. Roberts's) advice went, executed them. It was not at that time quite clear whether the main forces of

the enemy would move against us by way of Cedar Mountain or Madison Courthouse, and Ricketts' Division, of McDowell's Corps, was posted three miles in rear of Banks's position, and at the junction of the wagon road from Madison Courthouse and Rapidan Station to Culpeper, so as to be in the right place in either case. Gen. Buford had reported that the enemy was advancing on his position at Madison Courthouse, and early in the morning of the 9th he informed me that the enemy was moving force on his right, his left and partly on his rear, and that he was falling back toward Sperryville.

Gen. Sigel's Corps began to march into Culpeper late in the afternoon (Aug. 9), having been delayed many hours by Sigel's strange uncertainty about the road he should take. I had given specific orders a number of days before that all of the troops belonging to the Army of Virginia should be ready to march at the shortest notice, and for that purpose should keep two days' cooked rations habitually in their haversacks.

Notwithstanding this cautionary order, Sigel's Corps arrived in Culpeper without rations, and their provision trains being considerably behind they were without food. Instead of going forward at once to reinforce Banks, as ordered, it became necessary to issue rations to them from McDowell's trains, and give them time to cook and eat a meal, and thereby occasion delay which worked serious injury to the troops of Gen. Banks at the front.

## BANKS MAKES A BLUNDER.

Desultory firing had been kept up all day in the direction of Gen. Banks's position, but I continued during the whole of the day to receive reports from Gen. Banks that no considerable force of the enemy had yet come forward; that his cavalry had been ostentatiously displayed, but he did not believe him to be in any sufficient force to make an attack. As late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon he wrote me substantially to the same effect, but before I received this last note the artillery firing had become so rapid and continuous that I felt sure a severe engagement was going on or was being brought on. I therefore instructed McDowell to lead Ricketts' Division rapidly to the front, and preceded it myself. As no time during the day did Gen. Banks express any apprehension of an attack in force by the enemy, nor did he ask for reinforcements or intimate that he needed them.

I have always regretted that Gen. Banks thought it best to depart from my instructions and to push a battle before the troops necessary to win it could be brought to the field, but I have never failed to bear my testimony to his intrepid conduct during the battle of Cedar Mountain, nor to his patriotic and loyal deportment throughout the campaign. His corps, however, was badly cut up in that battle, as will be seen from what follows, and it was always a source of regret that so much gallantry as was there displayed by that corps served directly to keep it from the front for many weeks afterward.

[To be continued.]

## REQUIEM—IN MEMORIAM.

BY J. F. ROBESON, W. H. LITTLE FORD, PORT SCOTT, KAN.

Comrades once of flesh and blood;  
Comrades now of crumbling dust,  
Comrades once in battle's fiery flood,  
Comrades ever in freedom's glorious trust,  
Silent ye sleep in consecrated graves;  
Cold marble urn, or towering bust,  
Speak not of thy heroic deeds,  
Nor now with words or tears come we;  
And not as slaves' death tyrant's hands,  
But grandly singing anthems of the free,  
We deck thy grave with loving hands,  
Egypt's swart sons for tyrants bled,  
While Roman eagles shadowed slaves,  
The values of Greece with blood ran red,  
Her freedom's cause lies in her heroes' graves.  
The flag so proudly before us  
Is still the emblem that ye loved so well,  
The stars upon its folds as glorious  
As the blood-stained field whereon ye fell.  
Oh! comrades dead, we kneel this day  
Above thy lone and silent resting place,  
And fervently to our God we pray  
For freedom's boon to all the human race.  
We pray, with loyal hearts uprearing,  
The God of battle and the God of love,  
O'er comrades dead and comrades living,  
A firm avenger in the home above.

## VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

The Gallant but Disastrous Charge of May 22.


## DIGGING TRENCHES.

A Two Months' Storm of Shot and Shell.

## GRANT ON THE LINES.

Shooting Down the Rebel Ensign.

BY CAPT. FRANK SWIGART, 46TH IND.



It was the afternoon of May 21, 1863, that Hovey's Division arrived in sight of the rebel works at Vicksburg. After being deployed in line of battle we moved up as close to the works as we could without an engagement.

As soon as it was dark we crossed a hollow and took possession of the crest of a hill about a half mile to the front of the position we had occupied during the afternoon, and established our line on that hill and our camp in the hollow behind it. Here our camp remained during the siege. Hovey's Division had been detained at Champion Hills taking care of the wounded, burying the dead, collecting and caring for abandoned and captured



GOING TO THE TRENCHES.

property. Then again we were detained as rear-guard at Black River Bridge, and in consequence of these delays our division was the last of Gen. Grant's original army to arrive in front of Vicksburg, and were assigned to a place on the extreme left of that army. Until the arrival of other troops, to hold and occupy the ground between us and the river below the town, we had the extremely heavy duty of guarding our front, the left flank and rear of that wing of the army.

This, in addition to the details from our command for working in our trenches, made it very hard duty; but the men bore it bravely, and performed the hard service without a murmur or complaint. They felt that it was necessary, and that the army depended upon them for safety, and appreciated the honor implicitly given them by assigning them this dangerous position. When we got possession of the hills pickets were put out and the men were allowed to rest for the night.

## THE CHARGE OF MAY 22.

On the morning of the 22d our division, except the necessary guards and pickets, were placed in line of battle early, and marched some distance to the right and ordered to a position behind a hill, where the men were ordered to lie down, and it was given out at the time that we were to support Gen. Osterhaus's Brigade in a charge that he was to make that day on the rebel works. Soon we could see the men on our right preparing for the assault. From our position we could see one of the assaulting columns as it left cover and charged up to the rebel works. It was certainly a grand yet a terrible sight to see those brave men like a wave of the sea dashing against the rocks on the shore only to be broken to pieces. This column went over the hill and started for the works in the best order. But humanity could not withstand the tornado of lead and iron that met them as they advanced, and whole lines were swept away by the relentless fire of the enemy. Others took their places only to meet the same fate, until but a fragment of that gallant column was left. Yet that fragment would not yield the ground it had gained at such fearful cost, and the carnage went on.

## COLORS PLANTED ON THE REBEL WORKS.

A few daring spirits planted their colors on the outside of the rebel parapet, and where they could neither advance or retreat. Then the work of carnage ceased for a while, to be renewed after this pause with redoubled fury and greater loss of life than the former assault. All of this gallant work and noble sacrifice was to be made for naught; the assault was to end in a complete and terrible repulse at all points, with nothing gained that could not have been gained almost any evening without loss of life or limb.

The assault failed because the works of Vicksburg were impregnable to assault. Had Gen. Pemberton and his army been supplied

with clothing, ammunition and food, as he should have been, by the rebel authorities, considering the importance to the so-called Confederacy that Vicksburg was, it would have taken many and many weary days and nights of toil, would have cost thousands upon thousands of brave men's lives more than it did to capture it. It was only the failure of the rebel authorities to have the city properly supplied with ammunition, clothing and rations that gave Gen. Grant and his army the speedy victory they gained there.

We lay on the side of the hill where we had taken our position in the morning, while



I'M THE ONLY SURVIVOR.

the assault was being made and repulsed. We received no orders to move until about dark, when we were ordered back to our camping ground. Imagine our surprise a few days after the assault had been made, when we learned that Gen. McClellan had asked for and received reinforcement from other corps of the army, while one of his divisions lay within a few hundred yards of his assaulting column, ready to render assistance at a moment's notice, and yet was not called upon. This matter has never been explained, or any reason given. While we were thankful we did not have to go in there, yet we would like to know why we were left out.

## THE LUDICROUS PART OF THE CHARGE.

Like all affairs of this kind there were many ludicrous things happened which even provoked laughter during the time the terrible work of death was going on. One of the assaulting regiments was the 7th Ky. I may, however, be in error as to the number, as I write wholly from recollection. This regiment made a charge gallantly and bravely. The members of that regiment may be proud that they formed part of that gallant band. One of the men pretty badly wounded came back by us, and when asked how things were going at the front, said: "They have all gone to the devil. My regiment have all been killed or captured except myself; I am the only survivor." It was bad enough, but not as bad as he reported, as we soon learned from the squads of wounded coming back. Each one had a more or less exaggerated report of the affair.

Some people have censured Gen. Grant for ordering this assault, but we thought he was right, because of the apparent demoralized condition of the rebel forces outside of the city. And the reasons he has since given confirm us in our opinion, that Joe Johnston was in his rear with an army almost equal to his own, and the army inside of Vicksburg was almost as large as the force under his command, and they occupied such strong works that a small portion of it could hold them while the greater part could come out and give him battle. As to the first reason, however, this can be said, that the soldiers in Vicksburg were good soldiers, and no matter how badly they had been demoralized.



ENTERTAINING REBEL PRISONERS.

ized outside the city, when they got behind their works and had one night to rest and be reorganized, they were as ready to fight as ever. This they had had, and Gen. Pemberton and his officers had improved the time so well that when the assault was made we found them perfectly prepared to meet it, with the fearful cost to us that has so often been told.

## COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE.

The assault having been repulsed at every point, the siege began in earnest. Rifle-pits were dug for the protection of the infantry in front, and earthworks were thrown up for the artillery in the rear, while camps were prepared for the men and horses in the hollows or ravines, where they were in comparative security from the fire of the enemy. The men of my own regiment made their camp by digging in the side of the hill which we occupied, opposite the city, using the dirt taken out to level a place large enough for their "dog nests," as they called them; that is, large enough to accommodate four men. When they had this level they would drive a stake in the ground at each end, letting the two in the center extend out

of the ground five or six feet, put a pole on these to answer for the ridge-pole of the structure, and then on each side would drive two more not so high for the eave poles. Upon these they would stretch their oil-cloth blankets to keep off the rain. Then they would cover these with green twigs, weeds or canes to keep the sun off. Then for beds they would gather canes or rails, which were put on stakes about a foot from the ground, which made a very comfortable one, though not as soft as down, but good enough for men who wanted Vicksburg, and wanted it bad just then.

## THE TRENCHES BEFORE VICKSBURG.

This siege, like all others, was monotonous to those engaged in it. It was guard duty, camp duty, and work in the trenches. These trenches, of which we have heard so much, have never been described, that I have ever seen or read about. At the risk of being called tedious, I propose to describe those in our front. A favorable place on the hill-side was selected and a line for a trench marked out. If the place was not exposed, no temporary shelter was put up to protect the men. If it was an exposed place, cracker-boxes and barrels were put on the side next the city to shield the men. After an engineer officer had examined the ground and marked out the line, and as soon as it became dark, men were distributed along the line, and each one, besides his gun, had a pick or spade. He then laid down his gun and used the pick or spade until relieved by another detail. In this way the ditch or trench would be dug about two feet wide and as deep as possible during the night. The dirt taken out of the trench would be thrown up on the Vicksburg side, so that it aided in sheltering the men who were then at work on guard.

During the day these trenches were widened and deepened, so that from two to four men could march in them without danger. When extended in one direction as far as possible with safety to the men, another direction was taken and the same plan pursued; and thus we worked up closer to the enemy's works.

In exposed places on these lines, when through digging, we would place a heavy log on top of the earthworks with notches cut in the lower side for portholes, through which the men on duty could fire without danger to their heads. In some places, where very much exposed, we were compelled to cover the trenches with boards and earth, as the rebel sharpshooters would



THE BOX I DID NOT GET.

watch the portholes, and when darkened by a soldier, fire at the darkened hole.

AND ALWAYS HIT THEIR MAN. At one of these places one day two men were shot through the head. We then took cracker-box lids and darkened the hole at intervals until the rebel had fired 15 shots, not one of which missed its mark. That night that portion of the trench was covered and the trouble ended. One particular object was a large fort in our immediate front. After a few days of digging and planning we got into position to control it so that they could not use their guns, and all we had to contend with was their infantry, which were located, like ourselves, in trenches, and could keep up a constant fire on our lines. The fire from either side was so severe and accurate that it was worth a man's life to expose himself above the works. If a man did show himself, at least 50 men would get a shot at him before he could get under cover again, and some of these shots always took effect. Thus it was that we came to have great respect for each other, and always kept under cover.

Our artillery being posted on hills in our rear and protected by earthworks (besides the line of works or trenches in front), could with perfect safety keep up a constant fire on the city and its defenders, without their being able to reply. This, in connection with the fire from the gunboats and mortars raining down on the enemy, made it at all times unsafe to be on the streets or anywhere within the rebel lines, because our army and fleet completely encircled the city, and all parts of it were exposed to our fire, while they could fire at a given point but from one side—the front.

I should have added the fire of our infantry to that of the artillery when speaking of what the people inside the city had to undergo. Our arms were of the best kind. Our works almost encircled the town. Almost every place inside the rebel works was in range of some of the infantry lines. Indeed, we were told after the surrender that many of these leaden missiles of death went clear over the city and into the river, making it extremely perilous for either soldiers or citizens to leave their places of cover during the day. It was usual for the infantry to cease firing as soon as it was dark, but the artillery and mortars would continue their fire at intervals all night. All this certainly made those inside wish that they had not provoked Uncle Sam's wrath.

## GEN. ORD TAKES COMMAND OF THE THIRTEENTH CORPS.

While the men of the Thirteenth Corps did not approve Gen. McClellan's action on the 16th of May at Champion Hills, and again on the 22d of May, yet when about